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ENCOURAGING THE GRAND COALITION IN
CONVEX COOPERATIVE GAMES
TITU ANDREESCU AND ZORAN SˇUNIC´
Abstract. A solution function for convex transferable utility games encour-
ages the grand coalition if no player prefers (in a precise sense defined in the
text) any coalition to the grand coalition. We show that the Shapley value
encourages the grand coalition in all convex games and the τ -value encourages
the grand coalitions in convex games up to three (but not more than three)
players. Solution functions that encourage the grand coalition in convex games
always produce allocations in the core, but the converse is not necessarily true.
1. Cooperative games
We begin by recalling the main concepts and their basic properties. The notation
mostly follows [Cur97] and/or [BDT05].
Let N = {1, . . . , n}. The elements of N are called players, its subsets are called
coalitions, and the set N is called the grand coalition. A cooperative transferable
utility game with n-players is a function v : 2N → R such that v(∅) = 0, where 2N
is the set of all subsets of N .
For a given game v, we often denote v ({i}) by v(i) or vi. More generally, for
any function x : N → R and i ∈ N , we denote x(i) = xi. Thus we (sometimes)
think of functions x : N → R as vectors in Rn. For a function x : N → R and a
coalition A ⊆ N , we write x(A) =
∑
j∈A xj .
A game v : 2N → R is called super-additive if, for all disjoint coalitions A,B ⊆ N ,
v(A) + v(B) ≤ v(A ∪B)
and is called convex if, for all coalitions A,B ⊆ N ,
v(A) + v(B) ≤ v(A ∪B) + v(A ∩B).
Example 1. Define a 4-player game v onN = {1, 2, 3, 4} by the diagram in Figure 1
(the value of each coalition is provided at the vertex representing the coalition). The
same game is given in a tabular form in Table 1.
It is straightforward to check that the game v is convex.
A way to interpret cooperative games is as follows. Assume that the players in
the set N can form various coalitions each of which has value prescribed by v (say
v(A) represents the amount the coalition A can earn by cooperating). The super-
additivity condition implies that “the whole is larger than the sum of its parts”,
i.e., forming larger coalitions positively affects the value. The convexity condition
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Figure 1. A convex 4-player game
A v(A) A v(A) A v(A) A v(A)
{1} 0 {2} 0 {3} 0 {4} 0
{1, 2} 2 {1, 3} 2 {1, 4} 0 {2, 3} 1
{2, 4} 1 {3, 4} 1 {1, 2, 3} 4 {1, 2, 4} 3
{1, 3, 4} 3 {2, 3, 4} 3 N 6 ∅ 0
Table 1. A convex 4-player game
is just a stronger form of the super-additivity condition. It says that it is more (or
at least equally) beneficial to add a coalition to a larger coalition than to a smaller
one.
Assume that i is not a member of some coalition A. The marginal contribution
mi(A) of i to the coalition A is the quantity
mi(A) = v(A ∪ i)− v(A),
where A ∪ i denotes the coalition A ∪ {i}. Therefore, the marginal contribution of
i to A measures the added value obtained by bringing player i into the coalition A.
A game is convex if and only if, for every player i, and all coalitions A ⊆ B that
do not contain i,
mi(A) ≤ mi(B),
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i.e., it is more beneficial to add a player to a larger coalition than to a smaller
one (this is a well known fact; see for instance [Cur97, Theorem 1.4.2] or [BDT05,
Theorem 4.9]).
Example 2. The marginal contributions in the game from Example 1 are written
on the edges of the lattice of coalitions. For instance, the fact that m2({1, 3}) =
v({1, 2, 3})− v({1, 3}) = 4− 2 = 2 is indicated by the label 2 on the edge between
{1, 3} and {1, 3} ∪ {2} = {1, 2, 3}.
The top marginal contributionsm1(N−{1}), . . . ,mn(N−{n}) are often denoted
by m1, . . . ,mn. Further, we denote
M =
∑
i∈N
mi, T = v(N), V =
∑
i∈N
vi.
Note that, in a convex game, M ≥ T ≥ V .
Example 3. We provide a diagram for a general example of a game on three
players. The marginal contributions are indicated on the edges, Note that, for
i, j ∈ N = {1, 2, 3}, mi(∅) = vi, and whenever i 6= j, we denote mi ({j}) = mij .
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Figure 2. A game on 3 players
Note that, if the triple (i, j, k) is a permutation of N then
vi +mji +mk = T.
The convexity of the game is equivalent to the system of inequalities
(1) vi + vj +mk ≤ T ≤ mi +mj + vk,
where (i, j, k) ranges over the permutations of N (see the appendix for details).
An efficient allocation is a function x : N → R such that x(N) = v(N). If in
addition xi ≥ vi, for i ∈ N , the allocation is called individually rational.
An efficient allocation assigns revenue to each player in the game in such a way
that the total revenue shared among the players is exactly the value of the grand
coalition N . The individual rationality of an allocation then just means that each
player should be assigned revenue that is not below the individual value of that
player (otherwise that player would choose not to cooperate).
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A convex game is essential if T > V . In an inessential game, mi(A) = vi, for
all coalitions A not containing the player i, and there exists a unique efficient and
individually rational allocation, namely xi = vi, for all i ∈ N .
For a permutation pi of N , and a player i in N , denote by Pi(pi) the set of
predecessors of i in pi. This is the set of players that appear before i (to the left of
i) in the one-line representation of the permutation pi. For instance, if n = 6 and
pi = 142536, then P3(pi) = {1, 4, 2, 5}.
The set of permutations of N , denoted Πn, represents all possible orders in which
the grand coalition can be formed by adding the players one by one to the coalition.
For each such order, the players have different marginal contributions depending on
the set of players that has already joined. The marginal contribution of the player
i to the permutation pi, denoted mi(pi), is the marginal contribution of the player i
to the coalition Pi(pi) consisting of the predecessors of i in pi. In a convex game, for
any permutation pi ∈ Πn, we have mi(pi) ≥ mi(∅) = vi and
∑
i∈N mi(pi) = T . Thus
the marginal contribution vector along pi represents an efficient and individually
rational allocation for v.
An efficient solution function f is a function that assigns an efficient allocation
fv to every convex game (we emphasize that we are not concerned with non-convex
games).
Recall the definition of a well known efficient solution function introduced by
Shapley [Sha53].
Definition 1. The Shapley value of a convex game v : 2N → R is the allocation s
given by
si =
1
n!
∑
π∈Πn
mi(pi).
Thus the Shapley value is the average of all marginal contribution vectors along
all permutations of N .
We also recall the definition of τ -value, introduced by Tijs [Tij81].
Definition 2. The τ -value of an essential convex game v : 2N → R is the allocation
given by
τi =
M − T
M − V
vi +
T − V
M − V
mi.
In the case of an inessential game, the τ value is the unique efficient and indi-
vidually rational allocation.
Note that, for an essential game, τi = λvi + (1 − λ)mi, where λ =
M−T
M−V is the
unique real number in [0, 1] making the allocation efficient. For an inessential game,
vi = mi, for all i, and therefore the formula τi = λvi + (1− λ)mi gives the correct
τ -value for all λ in the interval [0, 1], i.e., the normalizing coefficient λ is not unique.
Both the Shapley value and the τ -value are efficient solution functions that assign
an individually rational allocation to every convex game.
Example 4. For any convex 2-player game,
s1 = τ1 =
1
2
(T + v1 − v2), s2 = τ2 =
1
2
(T + v2 − v1).
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2. Encouraging the grand coalition
We come to our main definition.
Definition 3. An efficient solution function f encourages the grand coalition if for
every convex game v : 2N → R and every coalition A ⊆ N ,
fvi ≥ f
vA
i ,
where vA : 2
N → R is the convex sub-game of v obtained by restriction on the
coalition A.
Thus an efficient solution functions encourages the grand coalitions if no player
in any convex game would prefer any coalition (and its associated allocation) over
the grand coalition. If f is an efficient solution that encourages the grand coalition
and if all players were to vote for all coalitions they like (based on maximizing the
revenue they would obtain by applying the proposed solution function f) the grand
coalition would be chosen by each player (even though some players may like some
additional choices).
Note that the property of encouraging the grand coalition is a global property
of solution functions and not of individual allocations (the property requires that
we compare allocations in different games).
Theorem 1. The Shapley value encourages the grand coalition in convex games.
Proof. Without loss of generality, it is sufficient to show that player 1 does not
prefer any coalition M = {1, . . . ,m} to the grand coalition, i.e., it is sufficient to
show that
1
n!
∑
π∈Πn
m1(pi) ≥
1
m!
∑
σ∈Πm
m1(σ),
for 1 ≤ m ≤ n.
Define a map ¯: Πn → Πm by flattening the permutations of N to permutations
ofM . Namely, for a permutation pi ∈ Πn define the permutation p¯i ∈ Πm by deleting
the symbols m + 1, . . . , n from pi and keeping the relative order of the symbols
1, . . . ,m the same as in pi (for instance, if n = 6, m = 4 and pi = 153462, then
p¯i = 1342). Every permutation in Πm is the image of exactly n!/m! permutations
in Πn under the flattening map.
Note that the set of predecessors P1(pi) of 1 in the permutation pi contains the
set of predecessors P1(p¯i) of 1 in the flattened permutation p¯i. Therefore, by the
convexity of the game, m1(pi) = m1(P1(pi)) ≥ m1(P1(p¯i)) = m1(p¯i).
It follows that
1
n!
∑
π∈Πn
m1(pi) ≥
1
n!
∑
π∈Πn
m1(p¯i) =
1
n!
·
n!
m!
∑
σ∈Πn
m1(σ) =
1
m!
∑
σ∈Πn
m1(σ),
which is what we needed to prove. 
Theorem 2. The τ-value encourages the grand coalition in all convex games of up
to three players.
Proof. Since the τ -value coincides with the Shapley value for 2-player convex games
and Shapley value encourages the grand coalition, it suffices to consider only 3-
player games.
Further, the τ -value always produces individually rational allocations. Thus, it
suffices to consider only 3-player games and their 2-player sub-games.
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By symmetry, it suffices to show that the convexity of a 3-player game v on
N = {1, 2, 3} implies the inequality
τv1 ≥ τ
v′
1 ,
where v′ is the sub-game corresponding to the coalition A = {1, 2}.
If the game v is inessential then so is its sub-game v′ and the τ -values for v and
v′ agree on A.
Thus we may assume that v is essential and we need to show that the convexity
of v implies
(2)
M − T
M − V
v1 +
T − V
M − V
m1 ≥
1
2
(T ′ + v1 − v2),
where T ′ = v(A) = T −m3 is the value of the coalition A = {1, 2}.
Denote m12 = T
′ − v2 = T −m3 − v2 (Figure 2 may be useful for visualization;
the marginal contribution vector along the permutation pi = 213 is important in our
considerations). Taking into account that M > V (from the fact that v is convex
and essential) the inequality (2) takes the form
(M − T )v1 + (T − V )m1 ≥
1
2
(T ′ + v1 − v2)(M − V ),
which is equivalent to
v1(m1+m3+v2−v1−v3−m2)+m12(m2+m3+v1−v2−v3−m1) ≤ 2m1(m3−v3),
after substituting V = v1 + v2 + v3, M = m1 + m2 + m3, T = v2 + m12 + m3,
and T ′ = v2 +m12, and performing simple algebraic manipulations. The convexity
implies that v1 ≤ m12 ≤ m1, as well as that m1 +m3 + v2 − v1 − v3 −m2 ≥ 0 and
m2 +m3 + v1 − v2 − v3 −m1 ≥ 0 (see the inequalities in (1)). Thus
v1(m1 +m3 + v2 − v1 − v3 −m2) +m12(m2 +m3 + v1 − v2 − v3 −m1) ≤
≤ m1(m1+m3+v2−v1−v3−m2+m2+m3+v1−v2−v3−m1) = 2m1(m3−v3),
which is what we needed to prove. 
Example 5. Consider again the convex game in Example 1. This example shows
that the τ -value does not necessarily encourage the grand coalition for convex 4-
player games.
Indeed, we have T = 6, V = 0, M = 11, which shows that the normalizing
coefficient λ in the formula for the τ -value is λ = (M −T )/(M −V ) = 5/11. Direct
calculation then gives the τ -values for v
τv1 =
18
11
≈ 1.64, τv2 =
18
11
≈ 1.64, τv3 =
18
11
≈ 1.64, τv4 =
12
11
≈ 1.09 .
On the other hand, for the 3-player sub-game v′ determined by the coalition A =
{1, 2, 3}, we have T ′ = 4, V ′ = 0, M ′ = 7, λ′ = 3/7 and the τ -values for v′ are
τv
′
1 =
12
7
≈ 1.71. τv
′
2 =
8
7
≈ 1.14, τv
′
3 =
8
7
≈ 1.14 .
Thus player 1 would prefer the coalition A to the grand coalition, showing that the
τ -value does not necessarily encourage the grand coalition.
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3. Relation to the core
We consider the relation between efficient solution functions that encourage the
grand coalition and the core of a convex game.
Definition 4. The core of a convex game v : 2N → R is the set of all efficient
allocations x : N → R such that, for every coalition A ⊆ N ,
x(A) ≥ v(A).
Note that every allocation in the core is individually rational and we may say
that the core allocations are rational with respect to any coalition.
Proposition 1. Let f be an efficient solution function that encourages the grand
coalition in convex games. Then, for every convex game v, the allocation fv is in
the core of v.
Proof. Let f be an efficient solution function that encourages the grand coalition
in convex games and let v be a convex game. Then, for any coalition A,
fv(A) =
∑
i∈A
fvi ≥
∑
i∈A
fvAi = v(A).
Thus fv is in the core of v. 
Since the τ -value does not always produce allocations in the core of a convex
function, we could immediately see that it cannot encourage the grand coalition in
general. However, in Example 5 the τ -value of the game v on N is in the core, as
is the τ -value of all of its sub-games, but this was still not sufficient to encourage
the grand coalition.
The proof of Proposition 1 indicates that, for essential solution functions, the
property of encouraging the grand coalition is a refinement of the property of pro-
ducing solutions in the core. Indeed, the core condition requires that, for each
coalition A ⊆ N , the sum fv(A) =
∑
i∈A f
v
i is at least as large as the sum∑
i∈A f
vA
i = v(A). On the other hand, for solution functions that encourage the
grand coalition, each term in the former sum must be at least as large as the cor-
responding term in the latter sum. In order to see that this refinement is proper,
we provide an example of an efficient solution function that always produces allo-
cations in the core of convex games, but nevertheless fails to encourage the grand
coalition.
Example 6. For any convex game v and any permutation pi of N , the vector of
marginal contributions along pi is an efficient solution in the core of v. By convexity
of the core, any convex linear combination of marginal contributions along several
permutations is also in the core. Therefore, we may define an efficient solution
function f as follows. Among all permutations of N select those that give the
largest vectors (in the usual sense in Rn) of marginal contributions and calculate
their average. Thus, if
L =
{
pi ∈ Πn |
∑
i∈N
mvi (pi)
2 ≥
∑
i∈N
mvi (σ)
2, for all σ ∈ Πn
}
,
define
fvi =
1
|L|
∑
π∈L
mvi (pi).
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To see that f does not encourage the grand coalition in convex games, even
though it always produces allocations in the core, consider the game in Example 1
restricted to N = {1, 2, 3} (completely ignore player 4).
In this game, the largest marginal vectors are the two vectors along pi1 = 231
and pi2 = 321 giving
fv1 = 3, f
v
2 =
1
2
, fv3 =
1
2
.
On the other hand, if we restrict to the sub-game v′ defined by the coalition A =
{1, 2} we obtain
fv
′
1 = 1, f
v′
2 = 1.
Thus player 2 would prefer the coalition A to the grand coalition.
4. Relation to population monotone allocation schemes
The notion of a population monotone allocation scheme was introduced in [Spr90].
Given a game v, a monotone allocation scheme is a set of efficient allocations
{xvA | A ⊆ N} associated to the sub-games of v, in such a way that, for every
player i and all coalitions A and B with i ∈ A ⊆ B ⊆ N ,
xvAi ≤ x
vB
i .
This definition is close in spirit to our definition of solution functions that en-
courage the grand coalition. However, the emphasis goes in different direction. We
study efficient solution functions that behave well on convex games, while Sprumont
studies games for which well behaved allocation schemes exist. More precisely, the
main thrust of Sprumont’s work is a characterization of games for which popula-
tion monotone allocation schemes exist (this includes all convex games, but not all
games with non-empty core). For us, on the other hand, the important question is
which solution functions always produce (or fail to produce) population monotone
allocation schemes in all convex games.
Sprumont shows that every 3-player game that is totally balanced (see the ap-
pendix for a definition) always has a population monotone allocation scheme. Nev-
ertheless, Theorem 2 does not follow directly from this observation (we still need
to prove that the specific scheme induced by the τ -value solution function provides
such an allocation scheme).
Further, Sprumont shows that the glove game on 4 players fails to have a pop-
ulation monotonic allocation scheme. Again, this example is not helpful in our
considerations, since the glove game is not convex (the main point of Example 5
is that the τ -value fails to provide a population monotone allocation scheme on a
convex game; on the other hand this game certainly has a population monotone
allocation scheme, namely the one induced by the Shapley value).
5. On necessity versus desirability
Observe that even if a solution function that does not encourage the grand
coalition is used and, for a concrete game v, there exists a player that prefers some
smaller coalition over the grand one, this does not mean that the grand coalition will
not be formed. For instance, in Example 5 player 1 prefers A = {1, 2, 3} to N , but
will have difficulties convincing player 2 and player 3 to form this coalition, since
they certainly prefer the payout provided to them by the grand coalition. Therefore
player 1 would perhaps choose to join the grand coalition (however grudgingly),
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since it is still offering a better payoff than going-it-alone (which would bring a
payoff of 0 to player 1). However, even if player 1 joins the grand coalition, it
would be unsatisfied with the situation and may show its discontent by actively
and visibly (or covertly and by using inappropriate means) working to undermine
the grand coalition and exclude player 4.
Thus encouraging the grand coalition is not necessary to coalescence all players
into the grand coalition, but may be desirable in practice.
Acknowledgments. The authors would like to thank Imma Curiel, who provided
valuable suggestions in the early stages of the manuscript preparation, and Iurie
Boreico, who did the same in the final stages.
Appendix A. Remarks on 3-player games
In Example 3 we provided a quick remark on a condition on 3-player games that
is equivalent to convexity and we used this condition in the course of the proof of
Theorem 2. We provide a brief justification.
Proposition 2. A 3-player game v is convex if and only if, for every permutation
(i, j, k) of N ,
(3) vi + vj +mk ≤ T ≤ mi +mj + vk.
Proof. As we already remarked, a game is convex if and only if, for every player i,
and all coalitions A ⊆ B that do not contain i, mi(A) ≤ mi(B).
Therefore, in the context of a 3-player game the convexity is equivalent to the
system of inequalities
(4) vi ≤ mij ≤ mi,
for i, j ∈ N , i 6= j.
The inequality (4) is equivalent to
vi + vj +mk ≤ vj +mij +mk ≤ mi + vj +mk,
where k is the third player (different from i and j). Since T = vj +mij +mk we
obtain
vi + vj +mk ≤ T ≤ mi + vj +mk.
Thus, when looked as systems of inequalities, (3) and (4) are equivalent. 
The games with non-empty core were characterized by Bondareva [Bon63]. Namely,
a game has a non-empty core if and only if it is balanced. A game v is balanced
if, for every sequence of non-empty subsets A1, . . . , As of N and every sequence of
positive real numbers λ1, . . . , λs such that
(5)
s∑
ℓ=1
λℓχAℓ = χN ,
where χAℓ and χN denote the characteristic function of the sets Aℓ and N , we have
s∑
ℓ=1
λℓv(Aℓ) ≤ v(N).
A game is totally balanced if all of its sub-games are balanced.
The following modification of the balancing condition is also valid.
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Proposition 3. A game v has non-empty core if and only if, for every sequence
of non-empty subsets A1, . . . , As of N and every sequence of positive real numbers
λ1, . . . , λs such that
(6)
s∑
ℓ=1
λℓχAℓ ≤ χN ,
where the inequality is considered pointwise, we have
(7)
s∑
ℓ=1
λℓv(Aℓ) ≤ v(N).
Proof. Let x be an efficient allocation in the core of v, and let
∑s
ℓ=1 λℓχAℓ ≤ χN ,
for some positive real numbers λ1, . . . , λs and a sequence of non-empty subsets
A1, . . . , As of N . We have
s∑
ℓ=1
λℓv(Aℓ) ≤
s∑
ℓ=1
λℓx(Aℓ) =
s∑
ℓ=1
λℓ
∑
i∈Aℓ
xi =
s∑
ℓ=1
λℓ
n∑
i=1
χAℓ(i)xi =
=
n∑
i=1
(
s∑
ℓ=1
λℓχAℓ(i)
)
xi ≤
n∑
i=1
xi = v(N).
The other direction follows from the result of Bondareva. Namely, if (7) holds
whenever (6) does, then (7) also holds whenever (5) does. Therefore the core of v
is non-empty. 
It is easy to see that for a 2-player game, convexity, super-additivity, and the
existence of core allocations are equivalent properties and it is well known that
these properties are not equivalent for more than 2 players.
Proposition 4. Let v be a 3-player super-additive game. DefineM12 = v12−v1−v2,
M13 = v13 − v1 − v3, M23 = v23 − v2 − v3, and S = v(N)− v1 − v2 − v3, where vij
is the value of the coalition {i, j}.
(a) The game v has a non-empty core if and only if
(8) S ≥
1
2
(M12 +M13 +M23).
(b) The game v is convex if and only if
(9) S ≥ max{M12 +M13, M12 +M23, M13 +M23 }.
Proof. (a) Assume v has a non-empty core. By Proposition 3 (or directly by the
argument used in the proof), since χ12 + χ23 + χ23 = 2χN , we obtain that v12 +
v13+v23 ≤ 2v(N). Therefore,M12+M13+M23 = v12+v13+v23−2(v1+v2+v3) ≤
2v(N)− 2(v1 + v2 + v3) = 2S.
Conversely, assume that (8) holds. Instead of trying to use Proposition 3, we
construct explicitly an element in the core.
Assume that the sum of every pair of numbers from {M12,M13,M23} is no
smaller than the third one (triangle-like inequalities hold). Set a1 =
M12+M13−M23
2
,
a2 =
M12+M23−M13
2
, a3 =
M13+M23−M12
2
, and t = 1
3
(
S − 1
2
(M12 +M13 +M23)
)
.
Then a1, a2, a3, and t are non-negative. Set x1 = v1 + a1 + t, x2 = v2 + a2 + t,
and x3 = v3 + a3 + t. Since x1 + x2 + x3 = v(N), the allocation x is efficient. The
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allocation x is individually rational (by the non-negativity of a1, a2, a3, and t). We
also have
x1 + x2 = v1 + v2 +M12 + 2t = v12 + 2t ≥ v12.
Thus the allocation x is rational for the coalition {1, 2}. By symmetry, x is rational
for the other two 2-element coalitions as well. Note that we have not used yet the
super-additivity property.
Assume that the sum of two of the numbers M12,M13,M23 is smaller than the
third, say M12 > M13 +M23 and set t =
1
2
(S −M13 −M23). The super-additivity
implies that v(N) ≥ v12+v3. Therefore S = v(N)−v1−v2−v3 ≥ v12+v3−v1−v2−
v3 = M12. Since S ≥M12 > M13+M23, we have that t > 0. Set x1 = v1+M13+ t,
x2 = v2 +M23 + t, and x3 = v3. Since x1 + x2 + x3 = v(N), the allocation x is
efficient. The allocation x is individually rational by the non-negativity of M12,
M13, M23, and t (for i 6= j, Mij is non-negative by the super-additivity property).
Further,
x1 + x3 = v1 + v3 +M13 + t = v13 + t ≥ v13
and, by symmetry,
x2 + x3 ≥ v23.
We also have
x1 + x2 = v1 +M13 + t+ v2 +M23 + t = v1 + v2 + S = v12 −M12 + S ≥ v12.
Thus the allocation x is rational for all 2-element coalitions.
(b) Note that the convexity needs to be checked only for coalitions that are not
comparable (the convexity condition is trivially satisfied when one of the coalitions
is included in the other). Therefore, given the super-additivity of the game, v is
convex if and only if, for every permutation (i, j, k) of N
vij + vik ≤ v(N) + vi.
The last inequality is equivalent to
Mij +Mik ≤ S. 
Therefore, we see that the convexity and the existence of the core are not equiv-
alent for 3-player games even in the presence of super-additivity. For instance, if
v1 = v2 = v3 = 0, v12 = v13 = v23 = 1 and vN = 3/2, we have a super-additive,
non-convex game with non-empty core.
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